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a b s t r a c t
This paper studies exchange economies in which agents have differential information about the goods
that the other agents bring to the market. To study such a setting, it is useful to distinguish goods not
only by their physical characteristics, but also by the agent that brings them to the market. Equilibrium is
shown to exist, with agents receiving the cheapest bundle among those that they cannot distinguish from
the truthful delivery. An example is presented as an illustration.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Economic agents usually trade goods without having perfect
knowledge of their characteristics. This applies to firms hiring
workers with unknown productivity, to consumers buying used
cars with unknown quality and to financial institutions buying
assets with unknown return. Each trader enters the market with
specific prior knowledge and observation abilities concerning the
characteristics of the goods being traded. This is a particular kind
of asymmetric information (adverse selection), famous since the
seminal contribution of Akerlof (1970).
General equilibrium models with adverse selection have been
developed by Prescott and Townsend (1984a,b), Gale (1992, 1996),
Bisin andGottardi (1999, 2006) andRustichini and Siconolfi (2008),
among others. In these models, agents enter the market having
private information about their endowments and preferences
in each of the possible states of nature. Here, an alternative
formulation is considered. Each agent’s private information is
described by a partition of the set of commodities, such that
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doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.04.002the agent can only distinguish goods that belong to different
sets of the partition. This formulation, in the spirit of Akerlof
(1970), was proposed by Minelli and Polemarchakis (2000) and
Meier et al. (2011).
The distinctive feature of the work of Meier et al. (2011) is the
consideration of what they designate as two-sided private infor-
mation: agents are allowed to have differential information about
the goods that the other agents bring to the market (instead of
being equally uninformed).1 This contrasts with what is assumed
in all the previous literature. For example, in the model of Dubey
et al. (2005), in which sellers of an asset may or may not default
on their promises of future payments, all the buyers receive the
same payoff (because deliveries are pooled). If one recognizes that
some buyers have superior abilities to identify the sellers who
are more likely to default, then it becomes essential to study how
and to what extent they are able to exploit their informational
advantage.
The model of Meier et al. (2011) is intended for the pursuit
of such an investigation. A drawback of their formulation is that
it only allows for the opening of markets for classes of goods
that everyone can distinguish. For example, if there is an agent
in the economy that does not distinguish red cherries from green
cherries, then the other agents cannot trade red and green cherries
at different prices. The existence of a single uninformed buyer
1 Agents are assumed to have perfect information about their endowments, and
only have differential information about the characteristics of the goods that are
brought to the market by the other agents. This is a natural assumption, based on
the observation that the owner of a good typically has superior information about
its characteristics.
188 J. Correia-da-Silva / Journal of Mathematical Economics 48 (2012) 187–195implies that the sellers of red cherries must charge the same price
as the sellers of green cherries.2
Here, an alternative framework is proposed. There are markets
for each of the goods, which may, therefore, be traded at different
prices. Nevertheless, an agent that buys red cherries, and is not
able to distinguish red cherries from green cherries, may end up
receiving green cherries instead of red cherries (or any mixture of
green and red cherries).3 Instrumental to this treatment of trade
with adverse selection is the concept of delivery rate, adapted from
the work of Dubey et al. (2005). If an agent that buys 10 tons of red
cherries receives 2 tons of red cherries and 8 tons of green cherries,
the corresponding delivery rates are 0.2 and 0.8. It is assumed
that agents take the delivery rates as given. In equilibrium, the
anticipated delivery rates must coincide with the actual delivery
rates.
As in the model of Prescott and Townsend (1984a,b) and the
subsequent literature, we assume that a profit-maximizing firm is
responsible for trade intermediation. Taking prices as given, the
firm buys the endowments and resells them to the agents. The firm
can find it to be in its interest to deliver bundles that are different
from those that the agents ordered. In fact, tomaximize profits, the
firmdelivers to each agent the cheapest possible alternative among
those that the agent cannot distinguish from the truthful delivery.
The firm is able to do this because the abilities to distinguish goods
(information partitions of the agents) are commonly known by
the agents and by the intermediary firm (all the primitives of the
economy are common information). This captures those situations
in which sellers are able to figure out whether they are facing an
informed or an uninformed buyer.
To sum up, the workings of the economy are summarized as
follows. Goods are labeled not only by their physical characteris-
tics, but also by the agent that brings them to the market. There
are prices for each of these generalized goods, taken as given by
the agents and by the intermediary firm. There are also personal-
ized rates of delivery for each of these generalized goods, chosen
by the intermediary firm and taken as given by the agents. An equi-
librium is composed by prices, delivery rates, orders and deliver-
ies, such that agents make orders that maximize the utility of the
resulting deliveries (given the correctly anticipated delivery rates),
which are feasible andmaximize the profit of the intermediary firm
(among those deliveries that the agents cannot distinguish from
the truthful delivery).4
The main result of this paper is the existence of equilibrium
(Section 2), under very general conditions (the utility functions
must be concave and strictly increasing). A characteristic of
equilibrium is that agents receive the cheapest bundle among
those that they cannot distinguish from truthful delivery, and
that the law of one price is verified: different sellers charge the
same price for the same good, but may charge different prices for
different goods even if these goods are not distinguished by some
of the agents (Section 3). To illustrate the main intuitions offered
by the model, an example is solved and explained (Section 4). The
welfare properties of themodel are studied and it is shown that the
equilibrium allocation can be Pareto-improved through a system
of taxes and subsidies (Section 5). The paper concludes with some
remarks (Section 6).
2 The differential information of the buyers is modeled as a ‘‘picking ability’’. All
buyers pay the same price, but the informed are able to pick the high quality goods,
while the uninformed pick at random.
3 An agent guarantees delivery of one out of a set of possibilities. This is closely
related towhatwas termed as ‘‘uncertain delivery’’ by Correia-da-Silva andHervés-
Beloso (2008, 2009, forthcoming), in a series of papers that study ex-ante trade of
contingent goods, with agents having different abilities to verify the occurrence of
the exogenous states of nature.
4 It would be interesting to study the implications of allowing the intermediary
firm to condition trading on quantity limits, as in the work of Dubey and
Geanakoplos (2002). We leave this investigation for future work.2. The model
Consider an exchange economy in which a finite number of
agents, i ∈ I = {1, . . . , I}, trade a finite number of goods, l ∈
L = {1, . . . , L}.
To capture the usual context in which the seller has superior
information about the quality of the goods that he/she brings
to the market, it is useful to consider a generalized notion of a
good, incorporating in its description the name of the agent that is
endowed with the good. This allows us to study markets in which
agents may not have the ability to distinguish good cars from bad
cars in general, but are able to observe the quality of their own cars.
We refer to good l that is in the initial endowment of agent i
as the generalized good (l, i) ∈ L × I. The initial endowments of
agent i, defined in terms of these generalized commodities, fi ∈ RLI+,
relate to the usual definition of endowments, ei ∈ RL+, as follows:
fi ∈ RLI+, with f (l,i)i = eli and f (l,j)i = 0,∀l, i, j ≠ i.
Similarly, the utility functions in terms of these generalized
commodities, Vi, can be obtained from the usual utility functions,
Ui : RL+ → R, as follows:
Vi : RLI+ → R;
Vi(xi) = U(zi), where z li =

j∈I
x(l,j)i .
Agents wish to maximize their utility functions, Vi(xi), which are
continuous, concave and strictly increasing.5
Assumption 1 (Preferences). The utility functions, Vi, are continu-
ous, concave and strictly increasing.
Each agent has specific abilities to distinguish the different
goods that are traded in themarket. These observation abilities are
described by a partition of the set of generalized goods, Pi, such that
(l′, j′) ∈ Pi(l, j) if and only if agent i cannot distinguish good (l′, j′)
from good (l, j).6
The inability to distinguish between two goods, (l, j) and (l′, j′),
implies that an agent that buys certain quantities of (l, j) and (l′, j′),
say y(l,j)i and y
(l′,j′)
i , may receive different quantities, x
(l,j)
i and x
(l′,j′)
i ,
such that
x(l,j)i + x(l
′,j′)
i = y(l,j)i + y(l
′,j′)
i .
More generally, when buying yi = (y(1,1)i , . . . , y(1,I)i , y(2,1)i , . . . ,
y(L,I)i ), agent i will receive xi = (x(1,1)i , . . . , x(1,I)i , x(2,1)i , . . . , x(L,I)i )
such that (see Box I).
The delivery matrix, ki, is endogenous (equilibrating variable).
The delivery matrices that are compatible with the abilities of
agent i to distinguish commodities are such that, for each (l, j),
(l′,j′)∈Pi(l,j)
k(l
′,j′),(l,j)
i = 1 and
k(l
′,j′),(l,j)
i = 0,∀(l′, j′) ∉ Pi(l, j).
The set of matrices that satisfy these conditions is denoted Ki, and
K =i∈I Ki.7
5 By strictly increasing, it is meant that an increase in consumption of any of
the goods is strictly desired by the agents: xi ≥ x′i and xi ≠ x′i implies that
Vi(xi) > Vi(x′i).
6 It is assumed that agents are not able to share information. This intends to
model situations in which sellers are not able to credibly announce the quality of
the goods that they bring to the market (like in the used car market).
7 The sum of the elements of a column must be equal to 1, and those elements
that correspond to goods that can be distinguished from the good in the diagonal
must be equal to 0.
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x(1,1)i
...
x(1,I)i
x(2,1)i
...
x(L,I)i

=

k(1,1),(1,1)i · · · k(1,1),(1,I)i k(1,1),(2,1)i · · · k(1,1),(L,I)i
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
k(1,I),(1,1)i · · · k(1,I),(1,I)i k(1,I),(2,1)i · · · k(1,I),(L,I)i
k(2,1),(1,1)i · · · k(2,1),(1,I)i k(2,1),(2,1)i · · · k(2,1),(L,I)i
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
k(L,I),(1,1)i · · · k(L,I),(1,I)i k(L,I),(2,1)i · · · k(L,I),(L,I)i

·

y(1,1)i
...
y(1,I)i
y(2,1)i
...
y(L,I)i

,
where k(l
′,j′),(l,j)
i ≥ 0 denotes the number of units of good (l′, j′) that agent i receives for each unit of good (l, j) that he/she buys.
Box I.It should be clear that if agent i is able to distinguish all the
commodities, that is, if Pi(l, j) = {(l, j)},∀(l, j), then Ki has a single
element (the identity matrix). A perfectly informed agent always
receives exactly the bundle that he/she orders.
For simplicity, it is assumed that agents have perfect informa-
tion about their own endowments.8
Assumption 2 (Perfect Information About Own Endowments).
∀(i, l) : Pi(l, i) = {(l, i)}.
Only goods that exist are priced and traded in the market. Such
goods are those for which

i∈I f
(l,j)
i > 0, a condition which is
equivalent to f (l,j)j > 0. Absence of some goods implies straight-
forward modifications of the spaces in which fi, ki, Vi and Pi are
defined.
The set of goods that exist is denoted by M ⊆ L × I, and
the number of goods that exist by M ≤ LI . When the classical
interiority assumption holds (ei ≫ 0,∀i ∈ I), all the goods are
traded in the market and, therefore,M = L× I andM = LI .
Taking prices, p ∈ ∆M , and delivery rates, ki ∈ Ki, as given,
agent i trades his/her initial endowments, fi ∈ RM+ , for a bundle,
yi ∈ RM+ , that maximizes utility, Vi(kiyi), among those that satisfy
the budget restriction, yi ∈ Bi(p), with
Bi(p) =

yi ∈ RM+ : p · yi ≤ p · fi

.
Notice that Assumption 2 guarantees individual rationality of
participating in the market. An agent can always buy back his/her
own endowments.
A profit-maximizing firm is responsible for trade intermedia-
tion.9 Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that the firm
buys the total endowments in the economy, as the firm can re-
sell the goods at the same price. When acting as a seller, the firm
can deliver a bundle that is different from the bundle that an agent
orders. To maximize profits, the firm delivers the cheapest possi-
ble alternative among those that the agent cannot distinguish from
truthful delivery.
It may seem that the intermediary firm is being given informa-
tion that the agents in the economy do not have themselves. In
fact, the intermediary firmonly uses information that all the agents
have.We have assumed that the economy is common information,
therefore, all the agents and the intermediary firm know the en-
dowments and information partitions of everyone. Therefore, hav-
ing the privilege of mediating all the trade, the intermediary firm
knows exactly what it is buying from each agent. And as agents
cannot cheat the intermediary firm about the goods that they are
8 In a dynamic setup, agents would probably have incentives to communicate
truthfully the characteristics of the goods they are selling in order to build or
preserve their reputation. Since communication is not allowed, this model is more
satisfactory for modeling situations in which there are no repeated interactions.
9 Profit-maximization is assumed, although this behavior may harm some
individuals who can be stockholders.delivering, there are no incentives for them to misreport to the in-
termediary firm the characteristics of each good.10 When choosing
what bundle to deliver to each agent, the intermediary firm also
makes use of information that is available to everyone: the infor-
mation partitions of each agent.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). An equilibrium of the economy E ≡
{fi, Vi, Pi}i∈I is composed of a price system, p∗ ∈ ∆M+ , individual
choices, y∗ = (y∗1, . . . , y∗I ) ∈ RIM+ , personalized delivery rates, k∗ =
(k∗1, . . . , k
∗
I ) ∈ K , and the resulting allocation, x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x∗I ) ∈
RIM+ , which satisfy:
y∗i ∈ argmaxyi∈Bi(p∗)Vi(k∗i yi),∀i [utility maximization];
k∗ ∈ argmink∈K

p∗ ·i∈I ki1¯ [profit maximization]11;
x∗i = k∗i y∗i ,∀i [resulting deliveries];
i∈I x
∗
i ≤

i∈I fi [feasibility].
Theorem 1 (Existence of Equilibrium). Under Assumptions 1 and 2,
there exists an equilibrium of the economy.
Proof. Consider, for now, bounded choice sets. For choices in
the upper bound to imply aggregate excess delivery, let E =
(l,j)∈M f
(l,j)
j + 1 and define the following convex and bounded
choice sets:
Y i = {yi ∈ RM+ : y(l,j)i ≤ E,∀(l, j)}.
The budget set of agent i, in this bounded economy, is
Bi(p) =

yi ∈ Y i : p · yi ≤ p · fi

.
Let ψi(y, p, k) = argmaxzi∈Bi(p) {Vi(kizi)}.
The utility function, Vi(kiyi), is continuous with respect to both
ki and yi.
As long as p · fi > 0 (which is always the case for p ≫ 0),
the budget correspondence, Bi(p), is continuous with non-empty
compact values.
When this is the case, we know, from Berge’s Maximum
Theorem,12 that the demand correspondence, ψi(y, k, p), is upper
hemicontinuous with nonempty compact values. It is also convex-
valued, because Vi is concave and ki is constant.
10 If an agent is endowed with er red cherries and eg green cherries, the firm may
not be able to distinguish the red from the green cherries, but knows, however,
that the agent is delivering er red cherries and eg green cherries. The agent could,
nevertheless, cheat the firm by labeling some of the red cherries as green and the
same number of the green ones as red. It seems that agents have no incentives
to do this, but a rigorous investigation of this possibility would require a more
sophisticated model. This is left for future work.
11 Since the profit-maximizing delivery matrix does not depend on the orders,
we consider a diagonal vector, 1¯, instead of the equilibrium order, y∗i , in the
argument for the minimization. Otherwise, the null coordinates of y∗i would lead
to a multiplicity of solutions, which could be interpreted, economically, as non-
credible threats.
12 See, for example, Aliprantis and Border (2006).
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
p ∈ ∆M : p ≥ ϵ. We will start by finding a fixed
point with strictly positive prices, on ∆Mϵ , and then let ϵ → 0 to
obtain a sequence of fixed points.
Let ψϵp (y, p, k) = argmaxq∈∆Mϵ

q ·i∈I(kiyi − fi).
And let ψki(y, p, k) = argmindi∈Ki

p · di1¯

.
All these correspondences (ψi,ψϵp andψki ) are upper hemicon-
tinuouswith nonempty compact and convex values. Therefore, the
product correspondence, ψϵ =Ii=1 ψi × ψϵp ×Ii=1 ψki , also is.
Applying the Theorem of Kakutani, we find that there exists
a fixed point of ψϵ , that we denote by (yϵ, pϵ, kϵ). Considering a
sequence, {ϵn}n∈N, that converges to zero, we obtain a sequence
of fixed points, {(yn, pn, kn)}n∈N. The sequence is contained in a
compact set, therefore a subsequence converges to (y∗, p∗, k∗).
We want to consider this subsequence and verify that its limit
is an equilibrium.
Suppose that the sequence of prices in the interior of the
simplex, {pn}, converges to a price on the border of the simplex.
There is at least one agent whose income does not tend to zero
(p∗ · fi > 0), and therefore whose demand (which is u.h.c.) is
driven to the bound of the choice set (recall that utility is strictly
increasing). This implies that, for sufficiently large n and in the
limit, there is aggregate excess delivery of at least some good:
∃(l, j) :

i∈I
x(l,j)∗i =

i∈I

(l′,j′)
k(l,j),(l
′,j′)∗
i y
(l′,j′)∗
i >

i∈I
f (l,j)i .
The budget restrictions imply that pn ·i∈I yni ≤ pn ·i∈I fi,
and the definition ofψki implies that p
n ·i∈I kni yni ≤ pn ·i∈I yni
(the identity matrix is enough for equality). In the limit
p∗ ·

i∈I
x∗i = p∗ ·

i∈I
k∗i y
∗
i ≤ p∗ ·

i∈I
y∗i = p∗ ·

i∈I
fi. (1)
Start by supposing that, in the limit, there is a single good, (l, j),
with maximal excess delivery. From the definition of ψp, the price
of this good tends to 1, and the remaining goods have vanishing
prices. Therefore, condition (1) implies that there is no excess
delivery (contradiction):
p∗ ·

i∈I
x∗i ≤ p∗ ·

i∈I
fi ⇒

i∈I
x∗(l,j)i ≤

i∈I
f (l,j)i .
Now consider the general case. Suppose that, in the limit, there is
a set of goods, G, tied for the maximal excess delivery. In the limit,
the prices of these goods must add to 1 (from the definition ofψp),
while the prices of the remaining goods become null. Condition (1)
implies that
p∗ ·

i∈I
x∗i ≤ p∗ ·

i∈I
fi ⇒

(l,j)∈G

i∈I
p(l,j)∗x∗(l,j)i
≤

(l,j)∈G

i∈I
p(l,j)∗f (l,j)i ,
which contradicts the hypothesis of excess delivery of all the goods
(l, j) ∈ G.
Therefore p∗ ≫ 0 and there is not excess delivery of any good
(x∗ is feasible). Existence of equilibrium in the bounded economy
is established.
To check that this is an equilibrium when the bounds on the
choice sets are removed, wemust verify that the individual choices
remain unaltered.
Observe that the bound on the choice sets is large enough for
the individual choices, y∗i , to be in the interior of Y i (otherwise we
would not have feasibility). Since preferences are convex, we are
sure that the bounds are not binding. If there were a strictly better
choice outside Y i, then there would also be a strictly better choice
in the frontier of Y i. 
We have established that, under general conditions, equilibrium
exists.3. Characteristics of equilibrium
A first property of the equilibrium allocation results directly
from the definition of equilibrium. Each agent receives one of the
cheapest bundles among those that he/she cannot distinguish from
the truthful delivery.13
Proposition 1.
p∗ · x∗i = minki∈Ki

p∗ · kiy∗i

.
In equilibrium, prices are strictly positive and there is no free
disposal.
Proposition 2.
p∗ ≫ 0 and

i∈I
x∗i =

i∈I
fi.
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 1, it was established that p∗ ≫ 0.
If, for some (l, j), we had

i∈I x
(l,j)∗
i <

i∈I f
(l,j)
i , then, from the
definition of ψϵp , we would have p
(l,j)∗ = 0. Contradiction. 
Each agent receives a bundle that costs the same as the bundle that
he/she bought.
Proposition 3.
∀i ∈ I : p∗ · x∗i = p∗ · y∗i .
Proof. From Proposition 1, we know that an agent cannot receive
something more expensive than what he/she bought. Then, from
exact feasibility (Proposition 2) it follows that all agents receive
a bundle that costs the same as the bundle that they bought.
If some agent received something cheaper, another agent would
have to be receiving something more expensive, which would be a
contradiction. 
An agent who does not distinguish between two goods prefers
to buy the cheapest. Therefore, two goods that the agents do not
distinguish (except for the owners, who surely distinguish their
endowments) and that are traded in the market (some agent other
than the owner buys a positive quantity) are traded at the same
price.
Proposition 4. If (l′, j′) ∈ Pi(l, j) and y(l,j)∗i > 0, then p(l,j)∗ ≤
p(l
′,j′)∗.14
Proof. Suppose that p(l,j)∗ > p(l′,j′)∗, and that y(l,j)∗i > 0. Replacing
good (l, j) by good (l′, j′) in the bundle that is bought by agent i, y∗i ,
we construct a bundle that is cheaper and that is undistinguishable
from y∗i . In equilibrium, agent i must be receiving, therefore, a
bundle that is cheaper than y∗i . This contradicts Proposition 3. 
In the case in which buyers do not distinguish the original
owners of the goods, the law of one price is verified (if the same
commodity is sold by two agents, then it is sold at the same price).
Proposition 5. If ∃i, i′, j, j′ and l such that (l, j′) ∈ Pi(l, j)∩ Pi′(l, j),
y(l,j)∗i > 0 and y
(l,j′)∗
i′ > 0, then p
(l,j′)∗ = p(l,j)∗.
Notice that this does not mean that, as in the model of Meier
et al. (2011), different goods that some agents cannot distinguish
are traded at the same price. What is stated is that the same good
is traded by different agents at the same price.
13 It should be clear that this adverse delivery is anticipated by the agents.
14 If we also have y(l
′,j′)∗
i > 0, then p
(l,j)∗ = p(l′,j′)∗ .
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In this section, an example is presented as an illustration.15 Here
the notation is simpler than in the previous section, because it will
not be necessary to deal with generalized goods in a formal way.
In the first scenario that is analyzed, an agent that does not
distinguish two goods is not able to consume the high quality good,
in spite of being willing to pay any price for a small quantity of
this good. In the second case, the two goods are traded at the same
equilibrium price. The uninformed agent receives both goods, with
delivery rates determined by the leftovers of the informed agents.
4.1. Cherry picking
Three individuals, I = {1, 2, 3}, trade three commodities,L =
{0, r, g}, that we can think of as ‘money’, ‘red cherries’ and ‘green
cherries’.
Agent 1 is endowed with ‘money’, agent 2 with ‘red cherries’
and agent 3 with ‘green cherries’:e1 = (12, 0, 0)
e2 = (0, 12, 0)
e3 = (0, 0, 12) .
All agents prefer ‘green cherries’ to ‘red cherries’. Agent 2 does not
like ‘red cherries’ at all. Preferences are described by the following
utility functions16:
U1 (x1) = ln

x01
+ ln xr1+ 2 ln xg1
U2 (x2) = ln

x02
+ 2 ln xg2
U3 (x3) = ln

x03
+ ln xr3+ 2 ln xg3 .
There is asymmetric information because agent 1 cannot distin-
guish ‘red cherries’ from ‘green cherries’ while agents 2 and 3 are
able to distinguish the three commodities:P1 = {{0}, {r, g}}
P2 = {{0}, {r}, {g}}
P3 = {{0}, {r}, {g}}.
Agents 2 and 3 are perfectly informed, and therefore receive
exactly what they buy. On the other hand, agent 1 can buy either
‘red cherries’ or ‘green cherries’, butmust acceptwhatever cherries
are delivered (because agent 1 cannot distinguish the two goods).17
Since agent 2 will not buy ‘red cherries’, his/her budget
restriction is (the price of ‘money’ is normalized to p0 = 1):
p0x02 + prxr2 + pgxg2 = prer2 ⇒ x02 + pgxg2 = 12pr .
The optimality condition implies equality of the ratios between
marginal utility and price, for each good demanded:
x02 =
1
2
pgxg2.
15 The example is adapted fromMeier et al. (2011). The preferences, endowments
and information are maintained to highlight the fact that the equilibrium concept
used here leads to qualitatively different solutions.
16 Precisely, we consider that agent 1 has lexicographic preferences. First, the
agent maximizes U1 (x1) = ln

x01
 + ln xr1 + 2 ln xg1. Then, in the case of
a tie (which occurs among all bundles with xg1 = 0), agent 1 is assumed to
maximize u1 (x1) = ln

x01
 + ln xr1. The fact that utility is equal to −∞ in
the boundary of the consumption set is cumbersome, but notice that the same
preferences can be represented by Cobb–Douglas utility functions such as Ui(xi) =
(x0i )
0.25(xri )
0.25(xgi )
0.5 . In any case, the utility functions are not strictly increasing
as assumed in Section 2 to establish existence of equilibrium. In Appendix A.1, the
utility functions are modified to Ui (xi) = ln

x0i + ϵ
+ ln xri + ϵ+ 2 ln xgi + ϵ
and an asymptotic analysis is conducted for ϵ → 0 to show that the results are
robust to a perturbation that yields strictly increasing utility functions.
17 Observe that there is an infinite number of possibilities for the delivery of 10
‘cherries’ (10 ‘red’ and 0 ‘green’, 5 ‘red’ and 5 ‘green’, 7 ‘red’ and 3 ‘green’, etc.).From the budget restriction and the optimality condition, we find
the demand of agent 2:
x02, x
r
2, x
g
2
 = 4pr , 0, 8 pr
pg

.
Similarly, we can obtain the demand function of agent 3:
x03 + prxr3 + pgxg3 = 12pg
x03 = prxr3 = 0.5pgxg3
⇒ x03, xr3, xg3
=

3pg , 3
pg
pr
, 6

.
Looking at the demand of agents 2 and 3 for ‘green cherries’, we
find that pr < pg , otherwise there would be excess demand. More
precisely:
8
pr
pg
+ 6 ≤ 12⇒ pr ≤ 0.75pg .
Suppose that agent 1 buys a quantity xrg1 of ‘cherries’ (guarantees
delivery of ‘red cherries’ and ‘green cherries’ such that xr1 + xg1 =
xrg1 ). If ‘red cherries’ are cheaper than ‘green cherries’, then the
agent should receive only ‘red cherries’, and no ‘green cherries’.
Following this reasoning, since pr < pg , then xg1 = 0 and xr1 =
xrg1 . Assuming that agent 1 is aware of this (delivery rates are
anticipated and taken as given), we can find his/her demand
function18:
x01 + prxr1 = 12
x01 = prxr1
⇒
x
0
1 + x01 = 12⇒ x01 = 6
prxr1 + prxr1 = 12⇒ xr1 =
6
pr
.
For demand to equal supply:
x01 + x02 + x03 = 12⇒ 4pr + 3pg = 6
xr1 + xr2 + xr3 = 12⇒
6
pr
+ 3p
g
pr
= 12
xg1 + xg2 + xg3 = 12⇒ 8
pr
pg
= 6⇒ pr = 0.75pg .
These equations allow the determination of equilibrium prices:
p∗ = p0, pr , pg = (1, 0.75, 1) .
The allocation is, therefore (y∗ = x∗ yields truthful deliveries)19,
x∗1 =

6,
6
pr
, 0

= (6, 8, 0)
x∗2 =

4pr , 0, 8
pr
pg

= (3, 0, 6)
x∗3 =

3pg , 3
pg
pr
, 6

= (3, 4, 6).
The major differences with respect to the solution obtained by
Meier et al. (2011) are that, here, the different types of ‘cherries’
are traded at different prices and the uninformed agent is not able
to consume any ‘green cherries’.
18 Agent 1 prefers any interior bundle (x1 ≫ 0) to a bundle that is in the frontier
of the consumption set. But he/she cannot get any ‘green cherries’ and, therefore,
U1 becomes infinitely negative. Recall that among bundles with x
g
1 = 0 (in the
boundary of the consumption set), the preferences of agent 1 are described by
u1 (x1) = ln

x01
+ ln xr1.
19 It is assumed that agents are not able to form coalitions and share information.
This captures the situations in which the sellers are not able to credibly announce
the quality of the goods that they bring to the market.
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Is it always the case that agent 1 does not consume ‘green
cherries’? In this modified example, we find that agent 1 can
consume ‘green cherries’ if the incentives for agents 2 and 3 to
deliver only ‘red cherries’ disappear.
This occurs if ‘green cherries’ become much more abundant
than ‘red cherries’. Let us double the endowments of agent 3 (‘green
cherries’):e1 = {12, 0, 0}
e2 = {0, 12, 0}
e3 = {0, 0, 24}.
The demand of agent 2 remains unaltered:
x02 + pgxg2 = 12pr
x02 = 0.5pgxg2
⇒ x02, xr2, xg2 = 4pr , 0, 8 prpg

,
while the demand of agent 3 doubles:
x03 + prxr3 + pgxg3 = 24pg
x03 = xr3pr = 0.5xg3pg
⇒ x03, xr3, xg3
=

6pg , 6
pg
pr
, 12

.
Now the demand of agents 2 and 3 for ‘green cherries’ does not
exceed supply as long as pr ≤ 1.5pg :
xg2 + xg3 = 8
pr
pg
+ 12 ≤ 24⇒ pr ≤ 1.5pg .
There are three possibilities: (a) the price of ‘green cherries’ is
higher than the price of ‘red cherries’ and thus agent 1 only
consumes ‘red cherries’ (as in the previous example); (b) the price
of ‘red cherries’ is higher than the price of ‘green cherries’ and thus
agent 1 only consumes ‘green cherries’; (c) the prices of ‘green
cherries’ and ‘red cherries’ coincide.
In case (a), there would be excess supply of ‘green cherries’, as
aggregate consumption is lower than 20:
xg1 + xg2 + xg3 = 0+ 8
pr
pg
+ 12 < 20.
In case (b), there would be excess supply of ‘red cherries’, as
aggregate consumption is lower than 6:
xr1 + xr2 + xr3 = 0+ 0+ 6
pg
pr
< 6.
Thus, in equilibrium we must have case (c): pr = pg = prg . Thus:
x2 =

4prg , 0, 8

x3 =

6prg , 6, 12
 ⇒ x2 + x3 = 10prg , 6, 20 .
The only candidate for an equilibrium allocation gives agent 1 the
following consumption bundle: x1 = (12− 10prg , 6, 4).
To check whether this is an equilibrium, we need to find the
demand of agent 1. A problem that we face is that agent 1, through
his/her demand, may influence the quality of the ‘cherries’ (the
proportion between ‘red’ and ‘green cherries’).
It is assumed that he/she takes the delivery rates of ‘red’ and
‘green cherries’ as given. In equilibrium, this proportion must be
fulfilled (otherwise it would not be an equilibrium). Since we
already have a single candidate for the equilibrium consumption
of agent 1, x1 = (12− 10prg , 6, 4), we must assume that agent 1
expects to receive 60% ‘red cherries’ and 40% ‘green cherries’.
The utility and the maximization condition of agent 1 are (with
xrg1 = xr1 + xg1)u1 (x1) = ln

x01
+ ln 0.6xrg1 
+ 2 ln 0.4xrg1 ⇒ x01 = 13prgxrg1 .
Putting this together with the budget restriction, the demand is
obtained:
x01 + prgxrg1 = 12
x01 =
1
3
prgxrg1
⇒ x01, xr1, xg1 = 3, 0.6 9prg , 0.4 9prg

.
For the demand of ‘money’ to equal the supply
x01 + x02 + x03 = 12⇒ 3+ 4prg + 6prg = 12⇒ prg = 0.9.
The equilibrium prices are, therefore, p∗ = (1, 0.9, 0.9), and the
allocation is
x∗1 = (3, 6, 4)
x∗2 = (3.6, 0, 8)
x∗3 = (5.4, 6, 12).
In this case, agent 1 consumes both ‘red cherries’ and ‘green
cherries’, which are traded at the same price. Agents 2 and 3
optimize by delivering 3.6 units of ‘red cherries’ and 5.4 units of
‘green cherries’ to agent 1.
The quantities of ‘red’ and ‘green cherries’ that agent 1 orders
(yr1 and y
g
1) are irrelevant, given that they add to 10. If y
∗ = x∗,
there is truthful delivery. In any case, the delivery rates adjust to
be such that delivery is surely that calculated above: xr1 = 6 and
xg1 = 4.
Observe that the increase in the endowment of ‘green cherries’
from 12 to 24 units led to a qualitatively different solution.
Increasing from12 to 13 diminishes the price of the ‘green cherries’
and increases the price of the ‘red cherries’, but the price of the
‘green cherries’ remains higher and, therefore, the uninformed
agent is still only able to consume ‘red cherries’. By straightforward
calculations, it can be found that as the endowment of ‘green
cherries’ hits 16, the prices of the two kinds of cherry become
equal, but the uninformed agent still receives only ‘red cherries’.
The solution, in this case, is
p∗ = (1, 0.75, 0.75)
x∗1 = (6, 8, 0)
x∗2 = (3, 0, 8)
x∗3 = (3, 4, 8).
Then, as the endowment of ‘green cherries’ increases further,
‘red cherries’ become more valuable than ‘green cherries’ because
the scarcity effect overweights the quality effect. The uninformed
agent becomes able to consume some ‘green cherries’ (those that
the informed agents leave for him/her). This is what occurs in the
above example (in which eg3 = 24). The equilibrium price of both
kinds of ‘cherries’ is higher (0.9 instead of 0.75) because of the
increased quality of the mix received by the uninformed agent.
Eventually, if the endowment of ‘green cherries’ increases
enough, the price of ‘green cherries’ becomes lower than the
price of ‘red cherries’, and the uninformed agent consumes only
‘green cherries’ and no ‘red cherries’. Such bifurcation occurs for an
endowment of ‘green cherries’ equal to 48, the solution becoming
p∗ = (1, 0.5, 0.5)
x∗1 = (4, 0, 16)
x∗2 = (2, 0, 8)
x∗3 = (6, 12, 24).
Fig. 1 plots the equilibrium prices as a function of agent 3’s
endowment of ‘green cherries’.
If the endowment of ‘green cherries’ is relatively small, ‘green
cherries’ are traded at a higher price than ‘red cherries’, and all
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the supply is absorbed by the informed agents — the uninformed
agent is not able to consume any ‘green cherries’. If the endowment
of ‘green cherries’ is very high, the opposite occurs. ‘Red cherries’
are traded at a higher price than ‘green cherries’, with agent 3
absorbing all the supply, and agent 1 not being able to consume
any ‘red cherries’. For intermediate values of the supply of ‘green
cherries’, both kinds are traded at the same price, with the
informed agents choosing their favorite combination of ‘green’ and
‘red cherries’, while the uninformed agent consumes whatever is
left.
Regarding the evolution of individual welfare as the endow-
ment of agent 3 increases (Fig. 2), we find that (i) the utility of agent
1 increases until eg3 = 37.3 and then decreases, because after this
point the decrease in the price of cherries is not sufficient to com-
pensate for the decrease in the delivery rate of ‘red cherries’ (which
are increasingly scarce); (ii) the utility of agent 2 increases with
eg3 until e
g
3 = 16 (because ‘green cherries’ are becoming cheaper),
then it decreases until eg3 = 48 (his/her purchasing power is de-
creasing as the ‘red cherries’ are also becoming cheaper), and then
it increases again (‘green cherries’ keep becoming cheaper but now
the price of ‘red cherries’ is remaining constant); (iii) the utility of
agent 3 is always increasing with his/her endowment, except at
eg3 = 48 (there is a price drop at this point due to the reduction in
the demand of agent 1, who becomes less willing to buy ‘cherries’
because no ‘red cherries’ are delivered to him/her).
5. Welfare
One of the robust conclusions of the literature on trade under
asymmetric information is that information asymmetries entail
a welfare cost. This model is not an exception. We find that the
equilibrium allocation is not Pareto-optimal and, moreover, that
it may be possible to design a system of taxes and subsidies that
induces a Pareto-superior allocation using only the information
that is common to all the agents.
It is straightforward to show that the equilibrium allocation
in the ‘‘cherry picking’’ example is not Pareto-optimal. An
improvement would result from the following reallocation: agents
2 and 3 transfer 1 unit of ‘cherries’ (of any kind, at their discretion)
to agent 1 in exchange for 2 units of ‘money’:
x∗1 = (6, 8, 0);U∗1 = −∞
x∗2 = (3, 0, 6);U∗2 = 4.6821
x∗3 = (3, 4, 6);U∗3 = 6.0684Fig. 2. Individual welfare as a function of eg3 .
H⇒
(reallocation)

x′1 = (2, 9, 1);U ′1 = 2.8904
x′2 = (5, 0, 5);U ′2 = 4.8283
x′3 = (5, 3, 6);U ′3 = 6.2916.
A system of anonymous taxes and subsidies can also improve
welfare in the ‘‘cherry picking’’ example. Suppose that the
government is able to monitor consumption of ‘money’ and
‘cherries’ and sets an ad valorem tax, t , on the consumption of
‘cherries’ while subsidizing the consumption of ‘money’ through
an ad valorem subsidy, s.
Considering eg3 = 15, without taxes and subsidies the equilib-
rium allocation is
x∗1 = (6, 8, 0);U∗1 = −∞
x∗2 = (3, 0, 7.5);U∗2 = 5.1284
x∗3 = (3, 4, 7.5);U∗3 = 6.5147.
Setting t = 0.05 and s = 0.1113 (budget-balanced), we obtain
(see Appendix A.2)
xt1 = (3.3756, 8.4286, 0.2381);U t1 = 0.4780
xt2 = (4.4513, 0, 7.6190);U t2 = 5.5545
xt3 = (4.1731, 3.5714, 7.1429);U t3 = 6.6339.
A tax on ‘cherries’ allows agent 1 to consume some ‘green cherries’
and thus become better off. Agents 2 and 3 also become better off
because agent 1 will then be willing to pay more for the ‘cherries’
(that they are selling).
6. Concluding remarks
In an economy in which agents trade goods with uncertain
quality, the ability to observe the quality of the good is very useful.
To study markets such as the used car market (Akerlof, 1970), it
is natural to assume that agents know the quality of the goods
that they bring to themarket, but have incomplete and differential
information about the quality of the goods brought by the other
agents.
To model this kind of information asymmetry, we have
considered a generalized notion of a good, incorporating in its
description the agent that is endowedwith this good. This allowed
us to study economies in which agents may not have the ability
to distinguish good cars from bad cars, but are able to observe the
quality of their own cars, or of the cars of their friends.
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fact that agents always receive the cheapest delivery that is
consistent with their observation abilities (that is, that they cannot
distinguish from truthful delivery). We have also found that the
law of one price is verified (if two agents sell goods that are
undistinguished by the others, then they sell them at the same
price).20
Finally, it is shown that a budget-balanced system of anony-
mous taxes and subsidies that only uses information that all agents
possess may lead to an allocation that superior in the sense of
Pareto.
Appendix
A.1. Cherry picking with perturbed utility functions
An objectionable feature of the ‘‘cherry picking’’ example is the
fact that the utility functions are not defined in the boundary of
the consumption set. Below, we modify the utility functions to
overcome this problem, by introducing a parameter, ϵ > 0:
U1 (x1) = ln

x01 + ϵ
+ ln xr1 + ϵ+ 2 ln xg1 + ϵ
U2 (x2) = ln

x02 + ϵ
+ 2 ln xg2 + ϵ
U3 (x3) = ln

x03 + ϵ
+ ln xr3 + ϵ+ 2 ln xg3 + ϵ .
Following the same steps as in the example with ϵ = 0, the
following demand functions are obtained:
x02 = 4pr + ϵ

pg
3
− 2
3

xr2 = 0
xg2 = 8
pr
pg
+ ϵ

2
3pg
− 1
3

x03 =
eg3p
g
4
+ ϵ

pr
4
+ p
g
4
− 3
4

xr3 =
eg3p
g
4pr
+ ϵ

pg
4pr
+ 1
4pr
− 3
4

xg3 =
eg3
2
+ ϵ

pr
2pg
+ 1
2pg
− 1
2

.
Suppose that eg3 > 48. In this case (for sufficiently small values of
ϵ), we must have pg < pr in equilibrium, otherwise the demand
of agent 3 for ‘red cherries’ would be greater than the aggregate
supply. This implies that agent 1 is only able to consume ‘green
cherries’.
Being aware of the fact that he/she will only receive ‘green
cherries’, agent 1 has the following demand:
x01, x
r
1, x
g
1
 = 4+ ϵ pg
3
− 2
3

, 0,
8
pg
+ ϵ

2
3pg
− 1
3

.
In equilibrium, demand must equal supply:
x01 + x02 + x03 = 12
xr3 = 12
xg1 + xg2 + xg3 = eg3
⇔

4+ 4pr + e
g
3p
g
4
+ ϵ

pr
4
+ 11p
g
12
− 25
12

= 12
eg3p
g
4pr
+ ϵ

pg
4pr
+ 1
4pr
− 3
4

= 12
8
pg
+ 8 p
r
pg
+ e
g
3
2
+ ϵ

11
6pg
− 7
6
+ p
r
2pg

= eg3.
20 The solution concept rules out price discrimination (the price of a good cannot
depend on the buyer).The equilibrium prices are
pr = 24e
g
3 + ϵ

24+ 7eg3 + 9ϵ

48eg3 + ϵ

144+ 3eg3 + 9ϵ

pg = 24+ 6ϵ
eg3 + 3ϵ
⇒

lim
ϵ→0 p
r = 1
2
lim
ϵ→0 p
g = 24
eg3
.
The opposite occurs if we suppose that eg3 < 16. For sufficiently
small values of ϵ, we must have pr < pg in equilibrium, otherwise
xg2 + xg3 > eg3 . In this case, agent 1 is only able to consume ‘red
cherries’.
The resulting demand of agent 1 is

x01, x
r
1, x
g
1
 = 6+ ϵ pr
2
− 1
2

,
6
pr
+ ϵ

1
2pr
− 1
2

, 0

.
And the equilibrium prices are
pr = 36e
g
3 + ϵ

60+ 8eg3 + 11ϵ

48eg3 + ϵ

96+ 6eg3 + 11ϵ

pg = 576+ ϵ (276+ 22ϵ)
48eg3 + ϵ

96+ 6eg3 + 11ϵ
 ⇒

lim
ϵ→0 p
r = 3
4
lim
ϵ→0 p
g = 12
eg3
.
Finally, suppose that 16 < eg3 < 48. For sufficiently small values
of ϵ, we must have pr = pg in equilibrium.21 In this case, utility
maximization by agent 1 implies that
1
x01 + ϵ
=

1− kg
(1− kg)xrg1 + ϵ
+ 2k
g
kgxrg1 + ϵ

1
prg
,
where xrg1 is the quantity of cherries that agent 1 buys, p
rg is the
price of cherries and kg is the delivery rate of ‘green cherries’.
Together with the budget restriction (x01 + xrg1 prg = 12), the
above condition allows us to find the demand of agent 1:
x01 =
15
2
+ ϵ

2+ kg
8kg (1− kg ) p−
3
8

−

− 9
2
+ ϵ

2+ kg
8kg (1− kg ) p−
3
8
2
+ ϵp [12(1+ k
g )+ ϵ(1+ kg − p)]
4kg (1− kg ) .
Assuming that kg converges to a value in (0, 1), we conclude that
limϵ→0 x01 = 3 and, therefore, limϵ→0 xrg1 = 9p .
Since limϵ→0

x01 + x02 + x03
 = 3+ 4prg + eg3prg4 , we must have
lim
ϵ→0

3+ 4prg + e
g
3p
rg
4

= 12⇒ lim
ϵ→0 p
rg = 36
16+ eg3
.
The associated limit allocation is
x01, x
r
1, x
g
1
 = 3, 12− eg3
4
,
eg3
2
− 8


x02, x
r
2, x
g
2
 =  144
16+ eg3
, 0, 8


x03, x
r
3, x
g
3
 =  9eg3
16+ eg3
,
eg3
4
,
eg3
2

.
21 Otherwise, if pr < pg , then xg1 = 0 and there would be excess supply of ‘green
cherries’; if pg < pr , then xr1 = 0 and there would be excess supply of ‘red cherries’.
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Consider an ad valorem tax, t , on the consumption of ‘cherries’
and an ad valorem subsidy, s, to the consumption of ‘money’.
Combining the first-order condition for utility maximization
with the budget restriction, we find the demand of agent 2:x02(1− s) =
1
2
xg2p
g(1+ t)
x02(1− s)+ xg2pg(1+ t) = 12pr
⇒

x02 =
4pr
1− s
xg2 =
8pr
pg(1+ t) .
Similarly, we find the demand of agent 3:
x03(1− s) = xr3pr(1+ t)
xr3p
r = 1
2
xg3p
g
x03(1− s)+ xr3pr(1+ t)+ xg3pg(1+ t) = eg3pg
⇒

x03 =
eg3p
g
4(1− s)
xr3 =
eg3p
g
4pr(1+ t)
xg3 =
eg3
2(1+ t) .
An equilibrium condition is that
xg2 + xg3 ≤ eg3 ⇔
8pr
pg(1+ t) +
eg3
2(1+ t) ≤ e
g
3.
Considering eg3 = 15 and t = 0, the above condition becomes
pr
pg
≤ 15
16
,
implying that agent 1 does not receive any ‘green cherries’.
In that case (no taxes), the equilibrium allocation is
x∗1 = (6, 8, 0);U∗1 = −∞
x∗2 = (3, 0, 7.5);U∗2 = 5.1284
x∗3 = (3, 4, 7.5);U∗3 = 6.5147.
Maintaining eg3 = 15 but now with t = 0.05, we find that the
demand of agents 2 and 3 for ‘green cherries’ is no longer sufficient
to absorb all the supply at pg < pr :
pg < pr ⇒ xg2 + xg3 <
8
1.05
+ 15
2 ∗ 1.05 = 14.7619.
Given that agent 1 receives some ‘green cherries’ and some ‘red
cherries’:
U1(x01, x
rg
1 ) = ln(x01)+ ln((1− kg)xrg1 )
+ 2 ln(kgxrg1 )⇒
∂U1
∂xrg1
= 3
xrg1
.Therefore, the demand of agent 1 is obtained as follows:x01(1− s) =
1
3
xrg1 p
rg(1+ t)
x01(1− s)+ xrg1 prg(1+ t) = 12
⇒

x01 =
3
1− s
xrg1 =
9
prg(1+ t) .
For the budget to be balanced, it is necessary that s = 12pr+e
g
3p
g
12 t .
In this case s = 27prg12 t .
The equilibriumprices can be obtained by equating the demand
and the supply of ‘cherries’:
xrg1 + xrg2 + xrg3 = 27⇔
9
prg(1+ t) +
8
1+ t +
15
4(1+ t)
+ 15
2(1+ t) = 27⇔ p
rg = 36
31+ 108t .
With t = 0.05 and s = 0.1113, we obtain prg = 0.9890 and
xt1 = (3.3756, 8.4286, 0.2381);U t1 = 0.4780
xt2 = (4.4513, 0, 7.6190);U t2 = 5.5545
xt3 = (4.1731, 3.5714, 7.1429);U t3 = 6.6339.
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